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ABSTRACT 
  American government officials are starting to experiment with a 
novel government-funding and privatization structure known as a 
social impact bond (“SIB”). An SIB is a contract between a 
government agency and a private entity in which the government 
agrees to pay the private entity an agreed-upon sum only if it can meet 
certain goals or outcomes. Currently, SIBs exist both globally and 
domestically, and are targeted to solve perpetual social ills such as the 
high homelessness and recidivism rates plaguing certain communities. 
  By analogizing the problems facing private prisons to the potential 
problems facing the use of SIBs, this Note details the privatization 
challenges that government officials will likely face as they implement 
SIBs. Most importantly, this Note is the first to propose how 
government officials implementing SIBs can overcome the traditional 
obstacles facing privatization schemes—both through the structure of 
SIBs and through additional contractual solutions. Finally, the Note 
concludes with a discussion about how elements of SIBs can be 
incorporated to improve existing privatization models such as private 
prisons, and how SIBs alter the existing debate about privatization in 
this country. 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider this scenario: a local government faces high 
incarceration rates with astronomical prison costs in the midst of 
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shrinking budgets. It knows that to lower these costs, it must lower 
recidivism rates. It knows also that multiple think tanks have 
concluded that prisoner-rehabilitation programs lower recidivism 
rates, thus potentially saving the government millions of dollars. 
Logic would suggest that the government invest now in these 
programs to yield greater cost savings and lower future crime rates. 
Yet it struggles to fund the program’s up-front costs in the face of 
constricting budgets and opposition to funding additional services for 
a historically unpopular population. At the same time, a wealthy 
corporation is searching for new investments in an increasingly tight 
economy. It is also looking to raise its social consciousness and 
charitable profile while still adhering to its first priority of accruing 
profit for its investors. Although the challenges facing the local 
government and the private corporation seem worlds apart, their 
varied interests can intersect and form an innovative private-public 
partnership that has the potential to deliver to both the public and 
private actors the outcomes they desire. This partnership and the 
agreement that follows is a new concept known as a social impact 
bond. 
A social impact bond (SIB) is a novel government-funding 
structure that focuses on funding outcomes rather than on funding 
inputs into government programs.1 An SIB is an agreement “between 
one or more government agencies and an external organization where 
the government specifies an outcome (or outcomes) and promises to 
pay the external organization a pre-agreed sum (or sums) if it is able 
to accomplish the outcome(s).”2 For example, if a local government 
wants to reduce its homelessness rate by x percent, it offers a private 
investor y dollars if the investor can achieve that level of reduction—
but only if the investor achieves that goal. In this sense, the term bond 
 
 1. See Benjamin R. Cox, Financing Homelessness Prevention Programs with Social Impact 
Bonds, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 959, 964 (2012) (“Social impact bonds are sometimes called 
‘pay for success’ (‘PFS’) bonds because they only pay upon realization of a contingency—
successful completion of the social intervention program.”). When the government funds inputs, 
it funds labor, start-up costs, and equipment. In contrast, when the government funds outcomes, 
it funds the realized goals or benefits that result from the program. For example, in the context 
of a prisoner-rehabilitation SIB, inputs include hiring staff and buying educational materials. 
The outcome would be the reduced reconviction rate of the group of prisoners enrolled in the 
rehabilitation program. 
 2. JITINDER KOHLI, DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV & KRISTINA COSTA, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS, SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 101: DEFINING AN INNOVATIVE NEW FINANCING TOOL 
FOR SOCIAL PROGRAMS 2 (2012), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2012/03/pdf/sib101.pdf. 
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is misleading because SIBs differ substantially from bonds.3 Bonds 
generally offer a fixed rate of return.4 In contrast, although 
bondholders assume risks of nonpayment, SIBs are likely riskier 
investments because the external organization receives a return only 
if certain outcomes are met.5 Thus, unlike the majority of government 
contracts in which the government pays up front for the services of a 
private organization, SIBs fundamentally change the structure of 
government contracts, refocusing them on outcome-driven goals.6 
SIBs can fund social programs such as those aimed at reducing 
the recidivism rate among released prisoners, reducing homelessness, 
and increasing access to early childhood education.7 Usually, SIBs 
involve several actors, including government agencies, private 
institutions, and nonprofit and philanthropic organizations.8 This 
nexus allows each actor to execute the role for which it is best suited 
and transfer the roles in which it traditionally underperforms to the 
actor that is better suited to implement them.9 
The use of SIBs globally has led U.S. lawmakers and business 
leaders to begin to initiate pilot SIB programs in the United States.10 
 
 3. MCKINSEY & CO., FROM POTENTIAL TO ACTION: BRINGING SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 
TO THE U.S. 12–13 (2012), available at http://mckinseyonsociety.com/downloads/reports/Social-
Innovation/McKinsey_Social_Impact_Bonds_Report.pdf. 
 4. See Bond, DICTIONARY OF FIN. & BANKING (Jonathan Law & John Smullen eds., rev. 
ed. 2012), http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199229741.001.0001/acref-
9780199229741-e-385?rskey=q1cBaC&result=523&q=. But note that the “fixed” rate can also be 
based upon a formula, in which the nominal return can change over time. See id. 
 5. JITINDER KOHLI, DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV & KRISTINA COSTA, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS, FACT SHEET: SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/04/pdf/sib_fact_sheet.pdf. 
 6. See id. (“Normally, government agencies fund tightly proscribed activities. In a Social 
Impact Bond, however, a government agency defines an outcome. The agency contracts with an 
external organization that promises to achieve that outcome and only pays the organization if it 
is successful.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 7. Id. at 2; Jon Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1052 (2013). 
 8. See Drew Von Glahn & Caroline Whistler, Pay for Success Programs: An Introduction, 
POL’Y & PRAC., June 2011, at 19, 19. 
 9. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 3, at 17 (“SIBs are generating interest for several 
reasons. One reason is that public-private partnerships and other multistakeholder 
arrangements have been shown to be effective ways to address complex, dynamic problems that 
exceed the capacity of a single sector or actor. SIBs, if executed well, can spur cross-sector 
collaboration and cooperation.”). 
 10. See NONPROFIT FINANCE FUND & THE WHITE HOUSE, PAY FOR SUCCESS: INVESTING 
IN WHAT WORKS 1 (2012), available at http://payforsuccess.org/sites/default/files/
pay_for_success_report_2012.pdf (describing the progress of the British and Australian 
governments in implementing SIBs and explaining the increased interest in SIBs among U.S. 
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In implementing SIBs, U.S. government officials and business leaders 
must be cognizant of the challenges that accompany private 
involvement in traditional government functions. The increasing 
interest in SIBs also intersects with the prevailing trend toward 
privatizing traditional government functions such as incarceration.11 
Thus, SIBs implicate a larger policy debate about the propriety of 
such privatization. This Note does not aim to come to a conclusion 
about the desirability of privatization, but rather it argues that SIBs 
can overcome the challenges that plague other forms of privatization. 
Government actors considering contracting with private 
investors in an SIB must be alert to these challenges and must 
implement solutions to mitigate the negative effects that these 
challenges have on SIBs. But with sparse scholarship on this novel 
funding structure, government actors have little predictability as to 
the problems they will face and the potential solutions to these 
problems. This Note contributes to the limited existing scholarship on 
SIBs by analogizing the problems facing private prisons to the 
potential problems facing the use of SIBs, thus providing government 
actors a roadmap of the challenges they will likely face in 
implementing SIBs. This Note also suggests specific proposals to 
overcome these challenges. Because both the privatization of prisons 
and SIBs inject private parties into traditional government spheres,12 
the two contexts share several important similarities. As a result, 
private prisons can serve as a useful analog in identifying the 
potential pitfalls facing the use of SIBs. Additionally, this Note will 
contribute to the scholarship by making the reverse application as 
 
local and state governments as well as President Obama’s $100 million request for SIBs in his 
2012 budget). 
 11. Cf. Carolyn Hoecker Luedtke, Innovation or Illegitimacy: Remedial Receivership in 
Tinsley v. Kemp Public Housing Litigation, 65 MO. L. REV. 655, 695 & n.231 (2000) (“While the 
74,000 privately held prisoners are a small proportion of the 1.8 million prisoners in the United 
States, it is a trend which introduces many of the accountability problems seen in the 
receivership context.”); Dru Stevenson, Privatization of State Administrative Services, 68 LA. L. 
REV. 1285, 1285 (2008) (“Privatization is an increasingly prevalent feature of state 
administrative law. It affects and overlaps all the traditional areas of academic discussion 
regarding state administrative law, including preemption, separation of powers, due process, 
and sovereign immunity. A cursory survey of recent litigation shows courts grappling with 
privatized state prisons, healthcare facilities, welfare programs, motor vehicle departments, 
workers’ compensation programs, and schools.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 12. See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 455–58 
(2005) (explaining that the private sector assumed responsibility for running penal facilities 
which the state had previously run, due to high incarceration rates). 
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well—that SIBs offer solutions to improve the existing problems 
facing private prisons and other traditional forms of privatization. 
This Note has five parts. Part I will explain the structure, 
operation, and emergence of SIBs. Part II will identify the similarities 
between private prisons and SIBs and explain why the problems 
plaguing private prisons are a good indicator of the potential 
problems of SIBs. Part III will describe the three primary problems 
facing private prisons. Part IV will analyze how these problems will 
likely arise in the context of SIBs and how the structure of SIBs can 
mitigate these problems. It will also propose additional contractual 
solutions to mitigate privatization’s negative effects. Finally, Part V 
will discuss how elements of SIBs can be incorporated to improve 
private-prison operation and how SIBs fit within the larger policy 
debate about privatization. 
I.  THE BASICS OF SIBS 
A. The Structure of SIBs 
SIBs may be structured in different ways, but all of them share 
similar features. First, SIBs require government agencies to define a 
desired outcome.13 Second, SIBs must have an external organization 
to execute the program that delivers the outcome, often known as a 
service provider.14 Third, SIBs need a population that benefits from 
the services.15 Additionally, though not necessary, most SIBs involve 
investors who provide seed capital to fund the external organization’s 
activities and intermediaries who manage the SIB project overall.16 
SIBs can also include “evaluation advisers (to help monitor and refine 
the program), and independent assessors (to determine if SIB targets 
are met).”17 In most SIB structures, an intermediary plays the largest 
role: it contracts with the government, “raising capital from 
investors,” choosing the external organization or service provider, 
and working with independent assessors to assure that the project’s 
goals are being met.18 Nevertheless, SIBs may take on other forms; 
 
 13. KOHLI ET AL., supra note 5, at 2. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 3, at 7. But see KOHLI ET AL., supra note 5 (containing no 
discussion of investors or seed capital). 
 17. MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 3, at 7. 
 18. Id. at 15. 
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their flexible structure makes SIBs potentially useful in a variety of 
situations.19 
B. Benefits and Challenges of SIBs 
There are several benefits to SIBs that make the funding 
structure advantageous over traditional forms of government funding. 
First and foremost, SIBs tie profit to socially valuable results. By 
avoiding the need to finance projects with taxpayer money, SIBs 
transfer risk from the government to either the investors who provide 
initial capital for the project or the external organization.20 The 
government compensates the investors or external organization only 
if the target outcomes are met.21 Unlike traditional privatization in 
which the government pays the up-front costs even if the initiative 
ultimately fails,22 SIBs insulate the government from such risk by 
shifting it to private entities.23 This “bang for the buck” structure thus 
mitigates wasteful public spending while also incentivizing 
organizations to target programs that achieve results.24 
 
 19. See Kristina Costa & Jitinder Kohli, Social Impact Bonds: New York City and 
Massachusetts To Launch the First Social Impact Bond Programs in the United States, CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2012/
11/05/43834/new-york-city-and-massachusetts-to-launch-the-first-social-impact-bond-programs-
in-the-united-states (“So long as these principles are retained, the structure of the deal and the 
players at the table can potentially take many different forms. Social impact bonds have great 
potential in a range of preventive social programs . . . .”). 
 20. See SOC. FIN., A NEW TOOL FOR SCALING IMPACT: HOW SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS CAN 
MOBILIZE PRIVATE CAPITAL TO ADVANCE SOCIAL GOOD 4–5 (2012), available at 
http://www.socialfinanceus.org/sites/socialfinanceus.org/files/small.SocialFinanceWPSingleFIN
AL_0.pdf (“If improved outcomes are not achieved, the government is not required to repay the 
investors, thereby transferring the risk of funding prevention services to the private sector and 
ensuring accountability for taxpayer money.”). 
 21. MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 3, at 7; SOC. FIN., supra note 20, at 4–5; see also Michaels, 
supra note 7, at 30 (“But, if the program does not meet the benchmarks, the bond organization 
recoups either none of its expenditures or only a fraction of what it initially invested. This 
means that the government doesn’t subsidize the private provider’s lack of success, and that the 
onus is on the bond organization to police the provider’s progress.”). 
 22. See SOC. FIN., supra note 20, at 13 (“Most governments pay for social services with 
insufficient consideration to how effective the programs actually are in achieving better 
outcomes for the target population.”). 
 23. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 3, at 7 (“[An] SIB is a multistakeholder partnership 
in which philanthropic funders and impact investors—not governments—take on the financial 
risk of expanding preventive programs that help poor and vulnerable people.”). 
 24. See Social Impact Bonds: Can a Market Prescription Cure Social Ills?, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Sept. 12, 2012), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.
cfm?articleid=3078 (“SIBs not only provide new sources of up-front capital for programs, but 
they are a way for the government to ensure it is getting real bang for its buck. . . . ‘This prompts 
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Second, SIBs provide seed capital to programs that lack funding 
because of limited government revenue due to the 2008 recession.25 
For many state and local governments, budgets remain tight.26 With 
limited budgets, revenues will likely go toward the most entrenched 
social programs as opposed to innovative projects that have never 
been implemented.27 Governments are also less likely to use their 
limited budgets to fund projects that serve historically unpopular 
groups such as the homeless28 and the prison population.29 To fix these 
funding deficiencies, SIBs usher in private capital to wholly replace or 
supplement public revenue to fund social programs.30 
Third, SIBs fund promising alternative programs and initiatives.31 
Philanthropic organizations, think tanks, and other nonprofit 
organizations face a dilemma in the sense that they expend 
considerable resources on research regarding alternative programs 
and innovative solutions, but then lack the resources to execute those 
 
a reevaluation of government outlays away from programs that don't work and toward 
programs that do.’” (quoting George Overholser, CEO, Third Sector Capital Partners)). 
 25. See id. (“While state tax collections are recovering from the hit of the recent recession, 
total state tax revenues adjusted for inflation for the first quarter of 2012 are still down 1.6% 
compared to the same quarter in 2008, according to the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of 
Government.”). 
 26. See id. (“And as of the first quarter of 2012, local tax revenue had actually fallen in real 
terms, by 1.8% over the previous 12 months.”). 
 27. Cf. Stephen F. Befort, The Constitutional Dimension of Unilateral Change in Public-
Sector Collective Bargaining, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 165, 165 (2012) (noting that as a result 
of the economic downturn and the decreased tax revenues it caused, discretionary expenses 
have been cut). Indeed, in some states, even the most important public services such as public 
education and low-income access to healthcare have experienced significant revenue decreases 
as a result of the recession. See Nicholas Johnson, Phil Oliff, & Erica Williams, An Update on 
State Budget Cuts, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Feb. 9, 2011), 
http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-13-08sfp.pdf. Thus, the allocation of state resources to innovative, 
untested social programs is even more unlikely in these states. 
 28. See Taylor Pospichel, Note, Are California’s Homeless Children Being Left Behind?: 
Analyzing the Implementation of McKinney-Vento Education Rights in California, 10 HASTINGS 
RACE & POVERTY L.J. 121, 131 (2013) (“The State’s limited budgetary resources have caused 
many cutbacks in funding for homeless service providers, therefore there is little relief for 
families experiencing or at risk of homelessness.”). 
 29. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Essential But Inherently Limited Role of the Courts in 
Prison Reform, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 307, 310 (2008) (“[T]here is a lack of political will to 
provide for adequate funding for prisons. There is no constituency with any political clout to 
pressure for sufficient funding for prison facilities or prison services. Politically powerless, 
prisoners certainly are a ‘discrete and insular minority.’”). 
 30. See Social Impact Bonds: Can a Market Prescription Cure Social Ills?, supra note 24 
(explaining that SIBs raise capital from “outside investors” for new social programs).  
 31. MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 3, at 7–8. 
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programs.32 The government usually will not fund these programs 
because of the inherent risk involved in an unknown program. SIBs 
usher in the private sector, which, unlike the government, thrives on 
these types of high risk, high reward investments.33 Because investors 
can provide seed capital and are in a better position to bear the risk of 
such investments, SIBs can cultivate innovative social programs that 
the government would not normally fund.34 
Finally, SIBs enable collaboration among different actors in the 
public and private realm as opposed to the traditional structure in 
which the government divides “money and information into different 
‘silos,’ preventing programs and agencies from working together 
effectively.”35 In this aspect, SIBs are unique because they allow each 
actor to execute the portion of the project in which it excels.36 For 
example, the government and its elected officials are best suited to 
establish the desired outcomes. Because government officials are 
elected, their popular election and accountability to the public gives 
them the legitimacy to establish what an SIB’s goals should be.37 The 
private sector is best positioned to provide capital to fund the initial 
activities or inputs.38 The service provider, which is usually a 
nonprofit, has the expertise in the particular area of concern and is 
 
 32. See id. at 8 (“To date, some nonprofit service providers have faced a frustrating 
situation: they’ve taken the time to collect data and discover what works for vulnerable people, 
only to find that there is no way to get these alternative programs to scale.”). 
 33. Investors thrive on and assume risk in investments because they are better able “to 
cope with risk by hedging or diversification” as compared to the government. PHILIP GRAY & 
TIMOTHY IRWIN, WORLD BANK GRP., EXCHANGE RATE RISK: ALLOCATING EXCHANGE 
RATE RISK IN PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 3 (2003), available at 
http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/266gray-121203.pdf. 
 34. See Social Impact Bonds: Can a Market Prescription Cure Social Ills?, supra note 24 
(“This market, Hsieh says, could provide critical funding to ‘scale up programs that might not 
have been scaled before.’ In addition, he notes, ‘maybe the government will be more likely to 
look for new approaches because the financial risk is being borne, in part, by the markets.’” 
(quoting Nien-he Hsieh, Associate Professor, Harvard Business School)). 
 35. KOHLI ET AL., supra note 2, at 3. 
 36. See SOC. FIN., supra note 20, at 12 fig.1 (explaining the role of the investors, 
intermediary organizations, service providers (nonprofits), and the government). 
 37. Cf. James Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy, and Elections: Implementing Popular 
Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 189, 200–13 (1990) (arguing 
that governmental legitimacy comes from “popular sovereignty and the consent of the 
governed”). 
 38. SOC. FIN., supra note 20, at 12 fig.1 (explaining that private investors’ roles in SIBs are 
to “make long-term investment[s]” in the project). An example of this is when investors pay 
service providers, such as prison-rehabilitation specialists, to implement SIBs. See supra note 20. 
In the context of prison rehabilitation, the input is the labor of service providers in executing the 
program. For greater explanation on the definition of inputs, see supra note 1. 
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best positioned to actually execute the program.39 Thus, because each 
actor is best suited to carry out its own targets, the program is more 
effective. 
An interrelated benefit, and one not yet contemplated by the 
literature, is that SIBs reflect a structure that acknowledges that the 
largest social ills of our day cannot be confronted by the government, 
the private sector, or philanthropic organizations acting alone. 
Rather, in an SIB, these actors work in concert to address large-scale 
social issues. This multifaceted approach to problem solving is a 
major advantage compared to other government-financing models. 
Though SIBs have a plethora of potential benefits, there are 
several barriers to their emergence in the United States. First, there is 
limited data on their success in practice.40 In theory, SIBs have a 
variety of advantages over traditional government-funding models, 
but because they are still in their infancy, there is limited data to 
support such a contention.41 Second, SIBs require that potential 
investors be willing to assume the risk of a particular project or 
operation.42 The potential pecuniary gains of success must be large 
enough to induce a private investor to assume the risk of failure.43 
Therefore, SIBs cannot feasibly fund all projects, but only those that 
sufficiently incentivize the private sector to invest. Third, SIBs are 
likely not the appropriate mechanism for funding projects that take 
longer than a couple of years to evaluate, thus limiting the range of 
their applicability.44 Finally, because SIBs increase the number of 
 
 39. SOC. FIN., supra note 20, at 12 fig.1 (“By providing effective prevention programs, the 
nonprofits improve social outcomes and reduce demand for more expensive safety-net 
services.”). 
 40. MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 3, at 11. 
 41. See id. (“Because SIBs are so new—the UK pilot is currently the world’s one and only 
SIB—much of what’s been written about them has been based on theory rather than data.”). 
 42. See JEFFREY B. LIEBMAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: A 
PROMISING NEW FINANCING MODEL TO ACCELERATE SOCIAL INNOVATION AND IMPROVE 
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 3 (2011), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2011/02/pdf/social_impact_bonds.pdf (arguing that private investors 
assume most of the risk in SIBs and thus “the interventions must have sufficiently high net 
benefits” for the investor to be willing to invest). 
 43. See id. (“The most significant obstacle to making social impact bonds work is 
identifying interventions with sufficiently high net benefits to allow investors to earn their 
required rates of return.”). 
 44. See Social Impact Bonds: Can a Market Prescription Cure Social Ills?, supra note 24 
(“‘In this embryonic stage, you are best off focusing on programs where you can assess results in 
the short term,’ Weigelt suggests. ‘If you need to wait 10 years to see if the goal was hit, that is 
not a good project for a SIB.’” (quoting Keith Weigelt, Professor, Wharton School of the 
University of Pennsylvania)). As SIBs are in their infancy, techniques may evolve to enable 
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actors who have a stake in the project, SIBs require strong 
communication among the actors.45 Most likely, the investors will 
have to hire an intermediary organization to oversee the project as a 
whole.46 The increased up-front costs associated with this model may 
make investors hesitant to invest.47 Despite these disadvantages, the 
many benefits of SIBs have resulted in considerable interest among 
private investors.48 
C. The Use of SIBs Globally 
The United Kingdom pioneered the use of SIBs in September 
2010.49 To fund the SIB, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) 
known as Social Finance UK raised £5 million in seed capital from 
investors.50 Known as the Peterborough Prison Project (the 
Peterborough SIB), this ongoing SIB aims to rehabilitate short-term 
prisoners over several years.51 The recidivism rate of these prisoners 
will be compared with the recidivism rate of prisoners who are not 
enrolled in the rehabilitation program.52 If the recidivism rate among 
prisoners enrolled in the program drops by 10 percent relative to the 
 
their use in longer-term projects. At their current stage of development, SIBs are likely limited 
to shorter-term projects. 
 45. See EMMA DISLEY, JENNIFER RUBIN, EMILY SCRAGGS, NINA BURROWES & DEIRDRE 
CULLEY, RAND EUR., LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PLANNING AND EARLY 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SOCIAL IMPACT BOND AT HMP PETERBOROUGH 49 (2011), 
available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/moj-
research/social-impact-bond-hmp-peterborough.pdf (noting that one of the challenges in the 
implementation of the Peterborough SIB is the “need for coordination”). 
 46. See SOC. FIN., supra note 20, at 12 (“Launching a Social Impact Bond requires a 
significant effort up front to identify and vet potential programs and then negotiate a contract in 
which the government agrees to repay investors if the selected nonprofit service providers 
achieve specified social outcomes. A dedicated SIB intermediary can play a valuable role in 
these initial stages.”). 
 47. See Social Impact Bonds: Can a Market Prescription Cure Social Ills?, supra note 24 
(“Compounding that challenge is the fact that SIBs do come with additional costs. Those costs 
include advisors who help governments structure a SIB along with independent evaluators who 
will assess whether the program hit the agreed-upon targets.”). 
 48. See id. (“According to a survey focused on high net worth individuals released in May 
2010 by San Francisco-based Hope Consulting, about 50% of those surveyed were interested in 
impact investing, pointing to a potential market of $120 billion.” (citing HOPE CONSULTING, 
MONEY FOR GOOD: IMPACT INVESTING OVERVIEW 7 (2010), available at 
http://www.hopeconsulting.us/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/MFG1-Impact-Investing-
Overview.pdf)). 
 49. MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 3, at 19. 
 50. Id. 
 51. DISLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at 3. 
 52. Id. 
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control group of prisoners, the government will pay investors a return 
of 7.5 percent.53 If the rate drops more, the government will pay a 
higher return of up to 13 percent.54 As with most SIBs, if the 
outcomes are not met, investors will receive no return and will lose 
their entire investment.55 Because the project has a six-year term, it is 
not yet known how successful these bonds will be in lowering 
recidivism rates.56 Nevertheless, the agreement has been successfully 
executed and the program is underway.57 
D. The Emergence of SIBs in the United States 
The concept of SIBs is gaining popularity among governments 
and the private sector in the United States.58 Most notably, New York 
City Mayor Michael Bloomberg announced the first SIB in the nation 
at the local level in 2012.59 Its goal is to reduce the recidivism rate 
among young men who are released from Rikers Island Prison 
(Rikers).60 The SIB involves several actors. Goldman Sachs represents 
the private investor and is providing the up-front costs (via a $9.6 
million loan) to MDRC, the nonprofit organization that oversees the 
service providers that carry out the intervention.61 Bloomberg 
 
 53. See id. at 40 (“Social Finance indicated that if reconviction events are reduced by 10% 
across all cohorts, investors are expecting an annual internal rate of return of around 
7.5% . . . .”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. (noting that investors will receive an “outcome payment” only if reconviction 
events are reduced by a certain percentage). 
 56. See id. at i (“However, given the early stage of development of the Peterborough SIB, 
we are unable to draw conclusions about or comment on outcomes.”). 
 57. See id. (explaining that the report’s goal is to show the development of the contract and 
the “early lessons” to be learned from the “implementation” of the program). 
 58. Social Impact Bonds: Can a Market Prescription Cure Social Ills?, supra note 24. 
 59. MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG, CITY OF NEW YORK, BRINGING SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 
TO NEW YORK CITY 2 (2012), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2012/sib_media_
presentation_080212.pdf. 
 60. Id. at 5. 
 61. Id. at 6. The service provider for the Rikers Island SIB is the Osborne Association, 
whose staff members are charged with implementing a program known as Adolescent 
Behavioral Learning Experience (ABLE). It plans to work with more than 10,000 Rikers Island 
prisoners during the time period of the SIB. According to the Osborne Association’s website, 
the prisoners 
will participate in an evidence-based cognitive behavioral intervention, skill-building 
recreational activities, and reentry planning. . . . The primary component of the 
ABLE program is an evidence-based cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) 
intervention. CBT is provided as a supplement to the regular academic program 
offered by the Department of Education (DOE) to adolescents in jail. The daily class 
schedule for each youth includes one period of CBT, which is facilitated by ABLE 
staff. The youth also have opportunities to participate in enhanced recreational and 
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Philanthropies has also agreed to provide a $7.2 million loan to 
MDRC to guarantee part of the investment.62 Additionally, the Vera 
Institute of Justice is an independent assessor that will “determine[] 
whether the project achieves the targeted reductions in 
reincarceration.”63 If recidivism rates fall within four years, then the 
city’s Department of Correction will pay MDRC, which then will pay 
back Goldman Sachs for its initial investment.64 If the program does 
not meet its goals, the Department of Correction pays nothing.65 
For Goldman Sachs to break even on its original investment, the 
recidivism rate must be reduced by 10 percent,66 which represents 
roughly $1 million in long-term net savings for the city.67 If recidivism 
drops by 20 percent or more, Goldman Sachs can profit up to $2.1 
million68 and the city can save a staggering $20.5 million in long-term 
net savings.69 Although the results of the program will not be available 
until 2017,70 if successful, the structure of this SIB will likely serve as a 
model for other local, state, and even federal SIBs in the future, as it 
is the first SIB established in the United States. 
 
extra-curricula[r] activities aimed at skill-building for successful re-entry, including 
leadership, job readiness, team building, positive socialization, and behavioral and 
emotional management. Many young people will also receive reentry planning and 
follow-up services. 
About the Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience (ABLE), THE OSBORNE ASS’N, available 
at http://www.osborneny.org/programs.cfm?programID=43 (last visited Aug. 4, 2013). 
 62. BLOOMBERG, supra note 59, at 6. 
 63. Id. at 4. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 6. 
 66. David W. Chen, Goldman to Invest in City Jail Program, Profiting if Recidivism Falls 
Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2012, at A14. 
 67. BLOOMBERG, supra note 59, at 7. Goldman Sachs’s potential $2.1 million profit comes 
from the approximately $11.7 million that the government will pay MDRC if it achieves a 
reduction of 20 percent or more. Id. If it achieves such a reduction, the city pays MDRC $11.7 
million and MDRC turns around and repays Goldman Sachs this sum of money. See John Olsen 
& Andrea Phillips, Goldman Sachs, Rikers Island: The First Social Impact Bond in the United 
States, CMTY. DEV. INV. REV. 2013, at 97, 99, available at http://www.frbsf.org/community-
development/files/review-volume-9-issue-1.pdf. Subtracting Goldman Sachs’s original 
investment of $9.6 million, it stands to yield a $2.1 million profit. Regardless of the program’s 
success, MDRC must repay Goldman Sachs for its loan, which it is able to do either through 
success payments received from the City or through the Bloomberg Philanthropies loan of $7.2 
million given to guarantee Goldman Sachs’s investment. Id. Thus, at worst, Goldman Sachs 
stands to lose $2.4 million. 
 68. Chen, supra note 66. 
 69. BLOOMBERG, supra note 59, at 7. 
 70. Caroline Preston, Getting Back More than a Warm Feeling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2012, at 
F1. 
BALIGA IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:10 AM 
2013] SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 449 
Even in their infancy, SIBs are gaining traction among U.S. 
political actors. Although the novelty of SIBs poses the risk of 
uncertainty to both government officials and private investors, there 
is support for their use in preventive programs in which governments 
have failed to invest. If the theoretical advantages of SIBs come to 
fruition, SIBs could signal a new wave of social-impact investing. 
Before the successes of SIBs can be evaluated, however, they must 
first be implemented. In establishing these agreements, government 
officials will face obstacles in their efforts to ensure that SIBs do not 
fall prey to the traditional pitfalls of the privatization of government 
services. 
II.  PRIVATE PRISONS AS AN ANALOG TO SIBS 
An examination of the problems of private prisons can help 
pinpoint potential challenges facing the use of SIBs in the criminal-
justice system. With limited research on SIBs, lawmakers interested 
in establishing SIBs have minimal insight as to their potential 
problems. This means that choosing to enter into an SIB agreement 
with private investors becomes even more of a gamble in the midst of 
tightening budgets and economic uncertainty.71 In this light, the 
privatization of prisons can serve as an analog to examine the 
potential successes and pitfalls of SIBs. Because of the similarities 
between the privatization of prisons and the use of SIBs in the 
criminal-justice system, the problems plaguing private prisons are a 
good indicator of the potential problems of SIBs. 
Because both the privatization of prisons and the use of SIBs 
involve the outsourcing of public services for profit, there are several 
integral similarities between the two contexts that make private 
prisons an apt analog to the use of SIBs in the prison system. First, 
the same impetus that resulted in the creation of private prisons is 
driving the use of SIBs in the criminal-justice system. Second, the 
primary motivation in both contexts is profit. Third, both the 
privatization of prisons and the use of SIBs inject the private sphere 
into traditional government functions. And, fourth, private prisons 
and prisoner-rehabilitation SIBs result in the private sector’s 
involvement with a historically unpopular group with few advocates. 
These similarities allow private prisons to serve as an accurate 
 
 71. See Social Impact Bonds: Can a Market Prescription Cure Social Ills?, supra note 24 
(explaining that state and local governments’ budgets have decreased significantly since 2008). 
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indicator of the problems that will likely face SIBs as governments 
implement them in the future. 
First, the driving force behind the emergence of SIBs is the same 
as the impetus for the creation of private prisons. The movement to 
privatize prisons was fueled by the striking increase in incarceration 
during the 1980s.72 As one scholar explains, “by the mid-1980s, many 
states were facing serious budgetary problems traceable to the 
increased cost of running their prison systems, and these problems 
have only grown in intensity as incarceration rates have continued 
their upward climb.”73 The increased rate of incarceration combined 
with the financial pressures to house a rapidly growing number of 
inmates resulted in a push to build and operate prisons more 
economically.74 Similarly, the use of SIBs in the criminal-justice 
system, particularly in the context of rehabilitating prisoners, has 
emerged as a solution to rising overall incarceration and 
reincarceration rates.75 Because incarceration is so costly76 and 
because repeat incarceration is prevalent,77 lowering recidivism rates 
is a key strategy to reduce costs.78 But rehabilitation programs are also 
costly, and governments often do not have enough money in their 
budgets to execute such rehabilitation programs.79 Considering the 
 
 72. Dolovich, supra note 12, at 455. 
 73. Id. at 456. 
 74. Id. at 455–58. 
 75. See Social Impact Bonds: Can a Market Prescription Cure Social Ills?, supra note 24 
(noting that SIBs are well-suited to fund rehabilitation and preventative programs for the nearly 
“50,000 incarcerated youth who are non-violent offenders and 1.6 million incarcerated adults 
with mental disorders or substance abuse problems” who can benefit from these services). 
 76. Jeffrey Brand-Ballard, Moral Emotions and Culpability for Resultant Harm, 42 
RUTGERS L.J. 315, 333 (2011). See generally JOHN SCHMITT, KRIS WARNER, AND SARIKA 
GUPTA, CTR. FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH, THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF 
INCARCERATION at 10 (2010), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/
publications/incarceration-2010-06.pdf (detailing the high cost of incarceration in America and 
its causes). 
 77. See Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 132 
(2003) (“Given that most felons will leave prison some day, and that recidivism is high, 
rehabilitation can be viewed as a means of crime control, not just as a reward to a malefactor.”); 
Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Imprisonment and Reoffending, 38 
CRIME & JUST. 115, 120 (2009) (“[R]eoffending among prison inmates is high, with rates of 
official recidivism often reaching 60 percent within 3 years.” (citation omitted) (citing Patrick A. 
Langan & David J. Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 58 
(2002))). 
 78. See BLOOMBERG, supra note 59, at 7 (providing a table that shows that reducing 
reincarceration can save New York City millions upon millions of dollars in the long term). 
 79. See Social Impact Bonds: Can a Market Prescription Cure Social Ills?, supra note 24 
(noting that the “source[s] of funding for many social programs” are being cut). 
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unpopularity of prisoners among the public,80 local governments may 
find it difficult to earmark funds for rehabilitation programs even if 
their end goal benefits society as a whole. Therefore, like private 
prisons, SIBs emerge as a solution to the budgetary problems facing 
local governments recovering from both the recession and the 
inability to earmark funds for rehabilitation programs when the state 
does have enough funds.81 
Second, SIBs and private prisons have the same primary goal of 
financial gain. For both private-prison operators and private investors 
in the SIB arrangement, financial gain is the primary, if not ultimate 
goal for the private-sector actor.82 Although the state pays at different 
points in the timeline of the program or service to be administered for 
private prisons and SIBs,83 the state remains “the ultimate paymaster” 
and the ultimate source of profit for both private-prison operators 
and SIB private investors.84 
A third similarity between private prisons and SIBs is the 
injection of the private sphere into traditional government functions. 
Fundamentally, because both private prisons and SIBs are forms of 
privatization, they center on the “contracting out of government 
services to the private sector” for profit.85 Thus, concerns about 
inappropriate policymaking, compromising quality to cut costs, 
 
 80. David M. Adlerstein, Note, In Need of Correction: The “Iron Triangle” of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1693 (2001). 
 81. See Dolovich, supra note 12, at 455–56 (explaining that private-prison contractors re-
emerged as a response to rising incarceration rates and funding obstacles). 
 82. See id. at 460–61 (stating that private-prison operators’ primary concern for profit has 
led to “disturbing results” for prisoners); see also Max Rivlin-Nadler, Goldman Sachs Looks To 
Turn a Profit on a Program To Fight Recidivism, THE NATION (Aug. 20, 2012), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/169472/goldman-sachs-looks-turn-profit-program-fight-
recidivism (describing that when public services are outsourced privately for profit, the public 
purposes of the service are secondary to the motive for profit). 
 83. See KRISTINA COSTA, SONAL SHAH, SAM UNGAR & SOC. IMPACT BONDS WORKING 
GRP., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 1 
(2012), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/FAQ
SocialImpactBonds-1.pdf (“In a social impact bond agreement, the government pays for 
realized outcomes at the conclusion of a contract, rather than paying upfront for programs or 
activities that may or may not have their anticipated effects.”). 
 84. See Dolovich, supra note 12, at 458 (“‘[T]he state remains the ultimate paymaster and 
the opportunity for private profit is found only in the ability of the contractor to deliver the 
agreed services at a cost below the negotiated sum.’” (quoting RICHARD W. HARDING, 
PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (1997))). 
 85. See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 717 (2010). 
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accountability, and oversight will likely arise.86 Outsourcing public 
services to private entities for private profit profoundly affects the 
distribution of power among the state, the public, and the private 
sector.87 Therefore, it is privatization’s ultimate profit motive 
combined with its tendency to alter the relationship among private 
and public actors that make the problems that affect private prisons a 
strong predictor of the obstacles that SIBs will face. 
Finally, the last integral similarity is the private sector’s 
involvement in providing services to a historically unpopular group. 
With respect to both private prisons and those SIBs aimed at 
reducing recidivism rates among prisoners, the private sector is 
interacting with a target population that is historically unpopular88 
and has few legal safeguards once convicted of a crime and 
incarcerated.89 Thus, privatization attempts raise questions about the 
government’s monitoring of the operation of prisons and 
rehabilitative programs. Therefore, without watchdog groups or 
advocates for incarcerated felons, the private sector may abuse the 
power it has over the target population. 
Although SIBs and private prisons face many of the same 
obstacles, SIBs are uniquely positioned to overcome the challenges 
confronting private prisons, as this Note will explain in Part IV. 
Because of the limited research on the use of SIBs, lessons learned 
from the privatization of prisons are central to the development and 
implementation of successful SIBs. 
 
 86. See id. at 718–19 (noting that privatization’s critics point to accountability concerns 
such as the evasion of oversight and that privatization can result in the private sector’s ability to 
alter policies that they are supposed to “neutrally” execute). 
 87. Cf. DISLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at iii (“In other payment-by-results arrangements, 
government has tended to maintain some control over the selection of providers. In the 
Peterborough SIB the government leaves that selection to an intermediary (such as Social 
Finance in the Peterborough SIB) and has no direct relationship with the service provider.”). 
 88. David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on 
Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2482 (1998). 
 89. See Kamal Ghali, No Slavery Except as a Punishment for Crime: The Punishment 
Clause and Sexual Slavery, 55 UCLA L. REV. 607, 620 (2008) (“Many state prosecutors are 
unwilling to prosecute prisoners for political reasons and tend to ignore most prison abuses.”). 
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III.  THE THREE PRIMARY PROBLEMS PLAGUING PRIVATE PRISONS 
A considerable number of competing scholars have debated the 
propriety of private prisons.90 The scholarship focuses on three 
primary problems. First, the act of privatization allows private prisons 
to exert a greater influence on public policy than is desirable, which 
leads to issues of accountability. Second, because private institutions 
have a profit motive, some private prisons compromise the quality of 
a prison to lower costs and thus increase profits. And third, the 
privatization of prisons has resulted in government relinquishment of 
monitoring and oversight roles that ensure the safety and efficacy of 
prisons. 
These three problems have serious implications. Although they 
do not mean that all private prisons are worse than public prisons, 
they shed doubt on the contention that privatization is an automatic 
solution to poorly run government services. For private prisons to be 
a viable solution to the incarceration problem in the United States, 
these problems must be addressed. 
A. Privatization Allows Private-Sector Policymaking which Leads to 
Issues of Accountability 
One of the primary concerns about the privatization of prisons is 
that the private actor will set policy even though the private actor is 
only supposed to execute the policy set by a legislature or a 
government agency.91 In this context, the argument against private 
prisons is that they allow the private-prison operator to exert too 
much influence over prescribed legislative ends, leading to issues of 
accountability.92 In theory, privatization should operate as follows: the 
government “sets programmatic goals and requirements” while it 
hires a private actor to actually implement the program.93 
Theoretically, the private actor is to have no influence or involvement 
 
 90. See Dolovich, supra note 12, at 440 (noting that the “emergence of privately run, for-
profit prisons, or ‘private prisons,’ sparked a heated debate” (quoting HARDING, supra note 84, 
at 2)). 
 91. See Michaels, supra note 85, at 719 (“They use government contracting in a way that 
substantively alters (or temporally ossifies) the very policies they are supposed to be neutrally 
administering.”). 
 92. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text. 
 93. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1395 (2003). 
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in setting policy.94 Rather, the private actor’s job is to implement what 
the government has agreed is the appropriate policy. 
In practice, however, private actors have much more 
responsibility and decisionmaking power than the government 
originally intended them to have.95 This is because “the power to 
implement and apply rules is inseparable from the power to set 
policy.”96 For example, private-prison employees interact with 
prisoners on a daily basis and review their daily behavior.97 Thus, it is 
these employees’ standards or at the very least their interpretation of 
standards that form the basis of acceptable prisoner conduct.98 This 
type of informal private-sector policymaking is exacerbated by the 
“necessarily incomplete” contracts between the government and 
private-prison operators that allow private operators “wide latitude in 
running the prison.”99 
There are several areas in which private-prison operators and 
their interest groups have affected policy, but the most important 
area is sentencing. Private-prison operators have exerted considerable 
influence over sentencing in states without fixed sentencing 
guidelines.100 In these states, the amount of time a prisoner serves is 
determined by the prisoner’s actions and behavior as decided by 
prison officials during the prisoner’s incarceration.101 Thus, private-
prison employees have considerable discretion in deciding what 
behavior violates the rules and what behavior will result in the 
issuance of disciplinary tickets.102 During a disciplinary hearing, prison 
officials decide whether the behavior is severe enough to revoke 
 
 94. See Michaels, supra note 85, at 719 (stating that private actors are “supposed to be 
neutrally administering” policies). 
 95. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551 
n.15 (2000) (“Contracting out service provision segues in many cases from implementation of 
government policy into policy making itself.”). 
 96. Metzger, supra note 93, at 1395. 
 97. Dolovich, supra note 12, at 518. 
 98. See id. (“[T]hose prison officials with direct day-to-day contact with inmates are in a 
position of considerable power over the length of the sentence individual inmates will ultimately 
serve.”). 
 99. See Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1877 
(2002) (“Contracts are necessarily incomplete: because the government and the private provider 
can only describe a general service and cannot specify beforehand in full detail exactly how the 
contractor should provide that service, the contractor has wide latitude in running the prison.”). 
 100. Dolovich, supra note 12, at 518–23. 
 101. Id. at 518. 
 102. Id. at 518–19. 
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good-time credits and, thus, extend the incarceration period.103 The 
determination of what behavior is punishable and what behavior can 
lead to a revocation of good-time credits constitutes a public-policy 
decision that should be decided by a legislature or a government 
agency.104 Nevertheless, because a private prison’s operation is so 
inextricably intertwined with its ability to discipline and to exert 
power over prisoners, private-prison employees effectively set policy 
in this area.105 
The danger of the private sector’s involvement in such 
policymaking is that its policies will usually be designed to maximize 
the private operator’s profit.106 Because “profitability depends on 
maintaining a high occupancy rate, [private-prison operators] could 
encourage their employees in subtle and not-so-subtle ways to make 
judgments regarding individual inmates’ behavior so as to prolong the 
amount of prison time that inmates serve.”107 The impact of “a single 
parole denial or revocation of good-time credit” is substantial, as it 
can be worth ten-thousand to twenty-thousand dollars or more per 
year for the private operator.108 Thus, private prisons have a weighty 
interest in ensuring high incarceration rates, and their policies will 
likely reflect such an economic interest. 
The private sector’s considerable influence over policy related to 
private prisons leads to issues of accountability.109 Whom does the 
public citizenry hold accountable for undesirable policies related to 
sentencing guidelines when private-prison actors are “further 
removed” than a public agency “from direct accountability to the 
 
 103. Id. at 519. Good-time credits, also known as good-conduct time, is credit given for a 
prisoner’s good behavior during incarceration. The credits go toward a reduction in a prisoner’s 
sentence, and are thus effectively a determination of the amount of time a prisoner serves. 
 104. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012) (“In theory, criminal sentencing is a matter of justice, a question of 
public policy. Legislators, sentencing commissions, police, prosecutors, and judges are supposed 
to weigh an array of public values. In a democracy, voters naturally expect public servants to 
serve the public's shared sense of justice.”). 
 105. See supra note 98. 
 106. See Dolovich, supra note 12, at 520 (“When the facility is run by a private, for-profit 
corporation, the worry is that the process will be skewed even more strongly against the inmate. 
The guard writing up the infraction, and in many cases the hearing officer as well, will be 
employed by a corporation with a direct financial stake—indeed, a paramount interest—in 
maintaining a high occupancy rate.”). 
 107. Id. at 518. 
 108. Id. at 522. 
 109. See supra notes 86, 91–99 and accompanying text. 
BALIGA IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:10 AM 
456 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:437 
electorate”?110 Whom do prisoners hold accountable if they believe 
that the policies related to discipline, disciplinary hearings, revocation 
of good-time credits, and parole hearings are fundamentally unfair? 
These accountability concerns are aggravated by the very nature of 
incarceration itself.111 The inability of the public and the prisoners to 
hold operators accountable for the most crucial aspects of criminal-
justice policy such as sentencing constitutes a serious pitfall of private 
prisons. 
B. Concerns about the Quality of Private Prisons as Compared to 
Public Prisons 
The second major problem with private prisons is that, because 
private institutions have a more acute financial interest in their 
operation than the public sector, some private prisons compromise 
the overall quality of a prison to lower costs and thus increase 
profit.112 It should be noted that there is considerable scholarly debate 
as to whether private prisons actually lower the quality of their 
prisons to save money or whether their spending cuts eliminate 
wasteful spending in prisons without lowering the quality of the 
prison overall.113 Nonetheless, the scholarship highlights a real danger 
that private-prison operators will diminish the quality of the prisons 
to save funds and make extra profit. 
There are two primary types of spending cuts in private prisons. 
First, private-prison operators can cut the amount spent per inmate 
for basic prisoner needs.114 The operator reduces or eliminates 
nonessential services such as libraries, recreational activities, and 
 
 110. See Freeman, supra note 95, at 632 (explaining that unlike government agencies, 
private actors have an additional step of removal from “direct accountability to the electorate”). 
 111. See id. (“Running a prison involves something more than enforcement: It confers on 
private actors a powerful combination of policy making, implementation, and enforcement 
authority in a setting rife with the potential for abuse.”). 
 112. See Lucas Anderson, Note, Kicking the National Habit: The Legal and Policy 
Arguments for Abolishing Private Prison Contracts, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 113, 125 (2009) (“To 
increase profit margins, many private prison companies implement cost-cutting measures that 
detract from essential inmate services. These service impairments frequently lead to foreseeable 
yet tragic situations.”); see also Dolovich, supra note 12, at 473–80 (explaining the negative 
effects of private prisons on “conditions of confinement”). 
 113. In some studies, private prisons perform comparably to public prisons. For example, 
one commentary points to several safeguards such as contract rescission, competition and the 
threat of replacement, and civil suits as checks on private-prison operators that prevent them 
from lowering the quality of prisons. Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 
99, at 1878–85. 
 114. Dolovich, supra note 12, at 474. 
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prisoner-rehabilitation programs.115 Second, private-prison operators 
can cut both the amount of labor and the amount spent on labor in 
private prisons.116 This includes hiring underqualified guards, 
minimizing the number of staff in a prison, and reducing staff 
training.117 Although these cuts reduce the cost of incarceration per 
prisoner, they also raise serious concerns regarding the quality of 
private prisons.118 
In several studies, private prisons have not fared well when 
compared with their public counterparts.119 Private prisons, relative to 
public prisons, tend to face two major problems as a result of cost-
cutting measures. For one, private prisons experience an elevated 
incidence of violence.120 Because private prisons staff fewer, less 
effectively trained prison guards than public prisons, more violent 
incidents occur among prisoners in private prisons than among their 
public counterparts.121 A second problem is that private prisons tend 
to have an increased rate of recidivism among their inmates because 
private prisons have “almost no contractual incentive to provide 
rehabilitation opportunities or educational or vocational training that 
might benefit inmates after release . . . .”122 Thus, cost-saving measures 
 
 115. See id. (“First, contractors will be tempted to reduce the amount spent on meeting 
inmates’ needs. In a prison, every aspect of inmates’ lives is dictated by the institution: when, 
what, and how much they eat; whether they get leisure time, adequate medical care, protection 
from harm, or access to rehabilitative or educational programming; the content and design of 
their beds and their cells; and when they shower and for how long. . . . In a private prison, each 
of these aspects of inmates’ lives offers the potential for increasing profit margins.”). 
 116. Id. at 475–76. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. at 476 (noting that these cuts “increase the threat to inmates of physical 
assault”). 
 119. See Michael Brickner & Shakyra Diaz, Prisons for Profit: Incarceration for Sale, HUM. 
RTS., Summer 2011, at 13, 15 (noting that private prisons may perform worse in the areas of 
“protection for the public, rehabilitation for the offender, and punishment for the criminal”); 
Dolovich, supra note 12, at 502–05 (explaining that private prisons tend to have more violent 
incidents than public prisons); Brad W. Lundahl, Chelsea Kunz, Cyndi Brownell, Norma Harris 
& Russ Van Vleet, Prison Privatization: A Meta-analysis of Cost and Quality of Confinement 
Indicators, 19 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 383, 384 (2009) (“Neither cost savings nor 
improvements in quality of confinement are guaranteed through privatization. . . . An empirical 
argument against privatization may be made based on the finding that publicly managed prisons 
tend to provide better skills training programs and seemed to generate fewer complaints or 
grievances.”). 
 120. See Dolovich, supra note 12, at 473 (“[P]rivate prisons are likely to be more 
violent . . . than state-run prisons.”). 
 121. Id. at 502–05. 
 122. See Patrick Bayer & David E. Pozen, The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional 
Facilities: Public Versus Private Management, 48 J.L. & ECON. 549, 554 (2005); see also 
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have resulted in quality diminishment in the important areas of safety 
and rehabilitation. 
C. Government Relinquishment of Its Monitoring and Oversight 
Roles 
The third and final major problem plaguing private prisons is 
that they have resulted in government relinquishment of monitoring 
and oversight roles that are designed to ensure the safety and efficacy 
of prisons.123 Effectively overseeing private prisons consumes 
substantial resources—“only a constant and omniscient governmental 
presence within the prison walls could ensure that a demanding 
contract’s performance standards are met” because private-prison 
operators have an incentive “to conceal information” and records.124 
Because government monitoring is costly,125 sufficient and effective 
governmental monitoring would essentially swallow the savings that a 
private prison accrues.126 
Not only does the government have little incentive to conduct 
more than minimal monitoring of private prisons, but it is also 
difficult for external groups, such as watchdog organizations, to 
monitor the prisons.127 Although NGO and civilian oversight have 
 
Anderson, supra note 112, at 130 (“The findings of the Bayer and Pozen study demonstrate how 
private prison companies encourage recidivism by actively neglecting or discouraging 
rehabilitative programs.”); Brickner & Diaz, supra note 119, at 15 (2011) (“States such as New 
Mexico, Alaska, Hawaii, and Vermont, which have some of the highest percentages of 
privatized prison beds, also have some of the highest three-year recidivism rates.”). 
 123. See James Theodore Gentry, Note, The Panopticon Revisited: The Problem of 
Monitoring Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 353, 358–60 (1986) (discussing several factors that 
“suggest . . . that the state as monitor will be less reliable than the state as administrator”). 
 124. Anderson, supra note 112, at 133. 
 125. Nicole B. Cásarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal 
Corrections: The Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 294 
(1995). 
 126. See Anderson, supra note 112, at 133 (“The degree of governmental oversight that 
would be necessary to ensure that private prison companies actually adhere to demanding and 
particularized contract or accreditation requirements would be so great as to increase costs to 
the point where neither the Government nor the contractor would agree to such terms.”); see 
also Cásarez, supra note 125, at 294 (“An agency therefore has little incentive to convert cost 
savings into monitoring expenses.”). 
 127. See Warren L. Ratliff, The Due Process Failure of America’s Prison Privatization 
Statutes, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371, 407 n.183 (1997) (“Without access to information on 
privatization contracts, inmates would not be able to learn the full range of their rights . . . nor 
would inmates, their lawyers, watchdog groups, or the media be able to ascertain whether 
private prisons had adequate contractual safeguards in place.”). 
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been considered effective in aspects of the criminal justice system,128 
structural barriers to revealing private-prison records and information 
make such external oversight unlikely to be as effective in the private-
prison context.129 Because private-prison records are unlikely to be 
covered by the Freedom of Information Act,130 it is almost impossible 
for watchdog organizations to gather objective information regarding 
the quality, safety, and efficiency of private prisons.131 This is a serious 
concern considering that the very nature of prisons lends itself to 
abuse and violence.132 Thus, because of the government’s 
relinquishment of oversight and external groups’ inability to monitor 
private prisons, many of these abuses persist, creating a more violent 
and degenerate prison atmosphere. 
In conclusion, problems relating to inappropriate policymaking 
over sentencing, lowering quality to save costs, and inadequate 
monitoring plague private prisons. Even if private prisons save money 
by cutting costs, the cost of violent and overcrowded prisons is too 
high to justify their existence in their current state. Lawmakers 
considering SIBs should pay careful attention to these privatization 
problems and consider how they may affect the success of SIBs. 
IV.  THE PROBLEMS AS APPLIED TO SIBS AND POTENTIAL 
SOLUTIONS 
This Part will analyze how the problems described above may 
affect the use of SIBs in programs such as lowering recidivism rates 
among prisoners. The potential for these problems to affect the 
success of SIBs should not be viewed as an argument against their use 
or against privatization more generally. Rather, it should be viewed as 
an instructive lesson for local, state, and federal government officials 
contemplating the use of SIBs. Government officials can maximize 
 
 128. See Michael B. Mushlin & Michele Deitch, Opening Up a Closed World: What 
Constitutes Effective Prison Oversight?, 30 PACE L. REV. 1383, 1397–98 (2010) (“Probably the 
best-known examples of oversight of the criminal justice system in the United States arise in the 
context of civilian oversight of law enforcement, rather than in the prison context.”). 
 129. See Cásarez, supra note 125, at 291 (stating that “prison records created and maintained 
by private prison management firms are unlikely to be considered agency records and therefore 
will not be subject to the” Freedom of Information Act). 
 130. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); see Cásarez, supra note 125, at 291. 
 131. See Cásarez, supra note 125, at 259 (“Only prisoners are in a position to judge the 
quality and sufficiency of the services provided, and prisoners are neither the most visible nor 
the most articulate group in society.”). 
 132. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. 
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the success of SIBs by preempting or mitigating these problems. For 
each problem, this Part will discuss how the structure of SIBs 
inherently mitigates the problem and what additional mechanisms can 
be instituted to prevent or further address the problem. Finally, this 
Part will propose several integral model provisions to be included in 
an SIB agreement, similar to the Model Contract and Model Statute 
that have been proposed for private prisons.133 These provisions aim 
to rectify the privatization problems associated with private prisons. 
A. Privatization Facilitates Private Sector Policymaking Leading to 
Issues of Accountability 
One of the problems of private prisons is that they allow private 
actors to exert a considerable degree of influence over policy 
decisions that should be made by the government, resulting in issues 
of accountability. This problem manifests itself in SIBs when the 
private sector cherry-picks the issues or target populations in which to 
invest.134 For example, private investors may consistently want to fund 
programs that target only female prisoners while eschewing projects 
that target male populations.135 The private sector’s willingness to 
invest only in certain social programs or in certain populations could 
lead to the government expending more money on that target 
population than originally intended. In this sense, the private sector is 
asserting a greater influence over what society thinks are important 
investments and thus, can directly affect or change public policy. 
The structure of SIBs mitigates this problem because private 
investors will only target and invest in projects for which they know 
the government will pay them a return if they meet certain agreed-
upon outcomes and goals.136 If no money is allocated to a particular 
SIB in the first place, the private investor will almost certainly decide 
not to pursue that project. Additionally, the theoretical success of 
 
 133. For a discussion of the Model Contract and Model Statute, both proposed in an article 
by Professor Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 
531 (1989), see infra Part IV.D. 
 134. See DISLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at iv (“A risk in [payment-by-results] models is that 
providers focus on members of the target group who are the easiest to help.”). 
 135. Cf. Candace Kruttschnitt & Rosemary Gartner, Women’s Imprisonment, 30 CRIME & 
JUST. 1, 44 (2003) (“Recidivism data uniformly indicate that women are less likely to reoffend 
than men.”). 
 136. See generally MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 3, at 14–15 (describing the structure of SIBs 
and the interaction among the different SIB actors). 
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SIBs has raised interest among a substantial group of investors.137 The 
more successful these projects are, the more interest that these 
projects will likely generate among private corporations and 
investors. Corporations and investors are generally interested in a 
variety of social projects, so the more interest there is among SIBs, 
the less likely it is that any one investor or corporation can influence 
the government to earmark money for a particular project while 
failing to focus on other social ills. This variety of interest is apparent 
as governments and investors have adopted even unpopular SIB 
projects such as rehabilitating prisoners.138 
Apart from the structural components of SIBs, lawmakers can 
rely on additional mechanisms to mitigate problems of inappropriate 
policymaking. One way to mitigate the concern that private-sector 
interest in a particular program will result in the government 
earmarking funds specifically for that project and taking away funds 
from projects that are socially desirable is to set up appropriations for 
SIBs in the budget.139 For example, legislators may earmark a certain 
amount for prison-rehabilitation programs, early childhood education 
programs, or reducing homelessness. This solution relates to the 
structure of SIBs because private investors will only be interested in 
investing in projects for which they know the government will 
compensate them if they meet the agreed-upon outcomes. 
Although there is a potent threat that the private sector may 
improperly influence legislative ends via SIBs, there are several steps 
that government actors can take to prevent such improper influence. 
In addition to the structural-mitigation aspects of SIBs, government 
actors can further mitigate these concerns by earmarking funds for 
desired legislative projects in advance of accepting SIB proposals 
from private investors. It is important to note that even with the 
implementation of this solution and the structural mitigation of SIBs, 
the private sector will likely still influence legislative ends to some 
 
 137. There is substantial interest among the wealthy in social-impact investing. See supra 
note 48. 
 138. See supra notes 29, 80, and 88 and accompanying text. 
 139. Massachusetts has established a “Social Innovation Financing Trust” (the Trust) to be 
funded “through annual appropriations,” but the funds themselves are not further earmarked 
for specific projects agreed upon by the legislature. See Costa & Kohli, supra note 19. The 
commonwealth solicited proposals for only two types of SIBs: homelessness and juvenile justice. 
Id. Although the commonwealth’s solicitation of proposals for these pinpointed goals mitigates 
the risk that private investors can improperly influence legislative ends, specifically earmarking 
appropriations in the Trust is a stronger and more permanent solution to mitigating such 
improper influence. 
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degree due to the nature of an SIB as an agreement between multiple 
actors.140 
B. Concerns about the Quality of SIBs 
A second concern with private prisons is that the profit motive 
will lead the operator to sacrifice quality for cost savings. In the 
context of SIBs, the private investor may choose a less-qualified 
service provider or may reduce the number of staff to administer the 
rehabilitation program to prisoners. However, the structural model of 
the SIB can address this problem quite significantly. Unlike the 
prison context in which the overall quality of the prison may suffer 
but prison operators will still be paid a set rate for every prisoner,141 in 
an SIB, the government only pays investors if the required outcome is 
achieved.142 Because SIBs embed economic incentives for improved 
quality into the agreement, the motive for profit is inextricably linked 
to the desired socially valuable result.143 
The private sector will likely not compromise quality because if it 
does, the very outcome that it relies upon for profit will not be 
achieved.144 For example, a program with fewer, less-qualified staff 
members will be less likely to actually succeed in rehabilitating 
prisoners. Consequently, any money the private investors put forth 
will likely be a waste unless that investment can achieve the agreed-
upon outcome.145 Rather, the economic incentives of the SIB result in 
significant private investment into the quality of SIB programs to 
achieve the outcome and make profit. Therefore, by tying profit to 
high-quality outcomes, SIBs structurally mitigate the risk—so 
commonly associated with privatization—that private actors will 
compromise quality for cost savings. 
 
 140. Cf. DISLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at 38 (explaining under the conclusions and potential 
lessons for future SIBs that the outcome measure had “the confidence of all stakeholders,” 
which would include the private investor). 
 141. See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. 
 142. See SOC. FIN., supra note 20, at 4–5. 
 143. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text. 
 144. See LIEBMAN, supra note 42, at 2 (“The private investors also perform an important 
form of quality control. That’s because service providers must convince the private investors 
that their program model and management team are likely to achieve the performance 
targets.”). 
 145. See id. (“[I]f performance targets are missed, [investors] will lose the money they 
invested.”). 
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Another way in which SIBs structurally mitigate the problems 
facing privatization is that the service providers themselves can 
perform a quality-monitoring role. In fact, service providers have 
much more expertise in the program to be administered and more 
experience with the target population than do private investors or the 
government.146 Because the service provider will most likely be a 
nonprofit or an NGO dedicated to achieving the particular goal (for 
example, lowering recidivism rates or reducing homelessness),147 the 
service provider will likely voice its concerns to the other SIB actors if 
there are quality-control issues, understaffing, abuses, or other 
problems.148 
Overall, the economic incentives underlying an SIB mitigate the 
concern that the private sector will compromise the quality of an SIB 
for cost savings. In addition to these structural-mitigation 
mechanisms, quality-control issues could also be decided before the 
contract is signed between the parties to the SIB.149 Overall, the use of 
SIBs has tremendous potential to diminish the quality issues that face 
private prisons. 
C. Government Relinquishment of its Monitoring and Oversight 
Roles 
The third and final problem with private prisons is that a shift of 
power from the government to the private sector may result in the 
government’s abandonment of its monitoring role. In the context of 
SIBs, the concern is that the government will relinquish its 
 
 146. Cf. SOC. FIN., supra note 20, at 28 (giving a hypothetical in which a nonprofit 
organization has focused heavily on a particular topic such as homelessness and has developed 
programs to address that particular topic in-depth). 
 147. Cf. id. at 17 (identifying “nonprofits with programs that have been shown to be 
effective” as “ideal candidates for SIB funding”). 
 148. Nonetheless, one can argue that a service provider hoping to retain employment as a 
service provider still has an incentive to underreport problems. Although that is a possibility, 
compared to private-prison operators or other for-profit providers, nonprofit service providers 
have a greater incentive to act as a watchdog. See Louise G. Trubek, Old Wine in New Bottles: 
Public Interest Lawyering in an Era of Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1739, 1744–47 
(2001) (“Nonprofit agencies serve as ideal candidates for providing services in a privatized 
system because they tend to be more participatory in their internal structures and delivery 
mechanisms than their for-profit counterparts. . . . Moreover, as nonprofits become more 
embedded in the social service delivery network, they are more likely to speak out when the 
needs of the community are not being met. Because they are in the best position to know what 
these needs are, nonprofits have a certain built-in credibility that other actors typically lack.”). 
 149. The ways in which the contract itself can mitigate concerns related to the quality of 
SIBs are discussed in Part IV.D. 
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monitoring role of the rehabilitative program because of the cost 
associated with such monitoring.150 Again, SIBs have structural 
controls that mitigate this problem quite significantly. Although SIBs, 
like private prisons, could transfer power from the government to 
private parties, SIBs distribute that power among more parties, 
including the intermediary organization, private investors, 
independent assessors, and the service provider.151 Therefore, unlike 
in the private-prison context, in which power shifts almost exclusively 
to the private-prison operator,152 in the context of SIBs, power shifts 
to multiple actors.153 Because power is distributed among more actors, 
there are more groups of people who have access to and can monitor 
the program. 
Furthermore, unlike in the private-prison context, the private 
company investing in an SIB is not operating or administering the 
services to the prisoners. Rather, the service organization, usually a 
nonprofit organization whose goal is to serve the target population, 
administers the program.154 Because these organizations usually 
involve staff who are dedicated to rehabilitating prisoners and who 
have expertise in working with prisoners, there is less concern that the 
service organization would exert power over prisoners in an improper 
manner in the way private-prison employees can.155 In this sense, 
concerns about abuse are generally mitigated by the very nature of 
prisoner-rehabilitation SIBs, which are designed to afford learning 
opportunities and counseling for prisoners.156 
The final and perhaps most robust structural solution to address 
problems related to ineffective monitoring is the economic incentives 
that an SIB creates. The government pays only if the targeted 
outcomes are met, so the private actor has an incentive to monitor the 
 
 150. Cf. supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text. 
 151. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 3, at 14–15 (describing the structure of SIBs and the 
interaction among the different SIB actors); Michaels, supra note 7, at 30 (discussing the 
relationships involved in an SIB). 
 152. See Anderson, supra note 112, at 122–24 (describing the discretionary powers delegated 
to private-prison administrators). 
 153. MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 3, at 14–15. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See supra Part III.C. 
 156. See Chen, supra note 66 (“The jail program, which will offer counseling and education 
for an estimated 3,400 incarcerated adolescent men each year, will be run by two nonprofit 
organizations, Osborne Association and Friends of Island Academy, and overseen by 
MDRC.”). 
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program to identify and to eliminate any abuses.157 Because 
monitoring is designed to eliminate abuses against the population to 
be served (in this case, the prisoners to be rehabilitated) and because 
such abuses would presumably lower the chances of meeting the 
targeted goals of lowering recidivism rates,158 the SIB incentivizes the 
private actor to assume the cost of monitoring to detect and to stop 
such abuses. Therefore, as compared to the current structure of 
private prisons, SIBs lessen the need for government oversight of the 
services they provide, resulting in even greater cost savings to the 
government while still ensuring baseline monitoring of the program. 
Lawmakers could entertain several additional solutions to 
mitigate the problem of ineffective monitoring. SIBs should still 
require some independent governmental oversight. Unlike private 
prisons, in which government monitoring and oversight expenditures 
would swallow up any of the savings produced by privatization,159 the 
same is not true of SIBs. Because the government has no up-front 
costs and does not have to provide up-front funding for the inputs of 
the program (such as paying the service provider),160 it might still 
make financial sense to monitor and oversee the program. Because 
there are so many other actors who can monitor the safety and 
efficacy of the program, the costs associated with oversight can be 
lowered substantially. 
For example, one cost-effective monitoring solution is to 
incorporate a board or a task group similar to the New York City 
Board of Correction, a well-known, independent-oversight 
organization.161 Members of this task group could be political 
appointments made by the mayor or other local authority.162 Like the 
 
 157. See LIEBMAN, supra note 42, at 2 (“The investors and bond-issuing organization also 
have strong incentives to rigorously monitor and improve program performance; if performance 
targets are missed, they will lose the money they invested.”). 
 158. Alexander Volokh, Prison Vouchers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 779, 785 (2012) (“Brutal 
conditions, as well as excessive use of high-security segregation, make prisoners less useful 
members of society and more likely to reoffend.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 159. See Anderson, supra note 112, at 130–32 (explaining that studies have failed to find that 
private prisons offer substantial savings, in part due to the costs of compliance monitoring and 
enforcement). 
 160. See Cox, supra note 1, at 968 (describing the funding structure of SIBs in which the 
government does not pay for initial inputs, but rather pays only upon the achievement of 
agreed-upon targeted outcomes). 
 161. See Mushlin & Deitch, supra note 128, at 1401 (“One of the best-known examples of 
governmental oversight is the New York City Board of Correction, which oversees and 
regulates the city’s jail system.”). 
 162. Id. 
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New York City Board of Correction, the members should not be 
compensated163 so that the costs would remain low. In this sense, 
though it is a government entity and represents the government, 
“there is an element of citizen involvement incorporated into this 
model.”164 To be most effective, the task group should have the 
authority to monitor the program firsthand, obtain reviews from 
staffers, and generally ensure that the program does not abuse the 
power that its operators have over the prisoners. 
In conclusion, the structure of SIBs, coupled with additional 
solutions, has the potential to reduce or even eliminate the problems 
associated with private prisons. Undoubtedly, the most important 
structural element of SIBs is the payment model that rewards the 
private actor only if the program achieves the desired outcomes. This 
payment scheme creates economic incentives to ensure high-quality 
programs and effective internal monitoring of potential problems, 
thus curbing many of the issues that burden private prisons. Though 
the incentives associated with SIBs abate these burdens, there are 
additional solutions, described above, that governments can 
implement to mitigate accountability, quality, and monitoring issues. 
These additional solutions should be incorporated into the SIB 
agreement. 
D. Important Provisions in SIB Agreements: The Legal Aspects of 
SIBs 
The cornerstone of an SIB is the agreement between the 
government and the various SIB actors.165 From a legal perspective, 
the contract should include provisions that rectify the nondelegation 
and due process issues plaguing private prisons. Many of these issues 
raise questions about whether incarceration is a core government 
function that cannot be delegated,166 and whether private firms’ 
discretionary authority over inmates’ liberties violates due process.167 
Responding to the emergence of private prisons, the research 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 1402. 
 165. See generally DISLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at 17 fig.1 (illustrating the complex 
contractual agreements necessary to execute the Peterborough SIB). 
 166. See Robbins, supra note 133, at 574–75 (1989) (discussing the means by which private 
prisons can avoid constitutionally impermissible behavior). 
 167. See Ratliff, supra note 127, at 403–09 (contending that prisons have too much power 
and that prison contracts are unconstitutional not because of the nondelegation doctrine but 
rather on due process grounds). 
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regarding the negative effects of private prisons, and the lack of 
scholarship on the legal aspects of private prisons, Professor Ira 
Robbins published an article on the legal aspects of incarceration.168 
The article proposes a Model Contract and Model Statute for 
jurisdictions to emulate if they decide to privatize their prisons.169 
The Model Contract and Model Statute aim to resolve many of 
the problems described above by creating a more complete contract 
that “preserv[es] accountability in the private-incarceration 
process.”170 For example, to mitigate issues related to inappropriate 
policy delegation, the Model Contract and Model Statute provide that 
“the contractor has no authority to influence the length of stay for 
any inmate.”171 Additionally, in terms of quality issues, the relevant 
terms set forth that “the contract must offer substantial cost savings 
and at least the same quality of services as would result from 
government provision.”172 With respect to monitoring issues, the 
terms state that “a permanent on-site monitor is required to enforce 
standards”173 and that “the contractor must meet the operating 
standards of quality specified by the American Correctional 
Association.”174 
Because the contract requires a performance bond to be posted 
and fines to be imposed if standards are violated,175 it incentivizes 
private-prison operators to consciously mitigate the problems 
typically associated with the privatization of prisons.176 Furthermore, 
because the Model Contract and Model Statute envision that the 
contracting government agency as well as third-party beneficiaries 
such as inmates and the public may sue for breach of contract,177 the 
 
 168. Robbins, supra note 133. 
 169. For a summary of the Model Contract, see id. at 738–57. For the Model Statute, see id. 
at 789–94. The purpose of the article was not to espouse a view as to the desirability of private 
prisons relative to public prisons, but rather to stress that “if privatization is undertaken,” local 
governments “must ensure accountability — to the public, to the government, to the inmates, 
and to the contractor’s own promises.” Id. at 543 (first emphasis added). 
 170. Id. at 612. 
 171. See Kenneth L. Avio, On Private Prisons: An Economic Analysis of the Model Contract 
and Model Statute for Private Incarceration, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
265, 276–77 (1991) (summarizing the core aspects of the Model Contract and Model Statute). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 277. 
 174. Id. at 276. 
 175. Robbins, supra note 133, at 647. 
 176. Avio, supra note 171, at 284 (explaining that a performance bond is one of several 
“incentive mechanisms” to fix quality issues). 
 177. Robbins, supra note 133, at 616, 783. 
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threat of legal liability also ensures that private-prison operators 
adhere strictly to the guidelines and the requirements memorialized 
in the contract. 
Although Professor Robbins’s Model Contract and Model 
Statute would seem to mitigate many of the problems associated with 
private incarceration, the provisions have not been widely adopted.178 
Furthermore, other approaches, such as imposing due process 
restrictions on the prison operators in the contract, have also been 
ignored.179 Rather, contracts between the contracting agency and the 
prison contractor remain alarmingly “lax” in many cases.180 Most 
private-prison contracts are incomplete181 and provide considerable 
autonomy for private-prison employees behind closed prison doors.182 
Perhaps the reluctance to adopt the Model Contract and Model 
Statute comes from the unwillingness of private-prison firms to be 
subject to third-party liability. Or, perhaps the provisions of the 
contract are too costly for the private firm to execute at a profit. 
Regardless of the reason, contracts between government agencies and 
private-prison firms remain incomplete, allowing an inappropriate 
amount of policymaking authority to be delegated to the private 
prison without accountability for their outcomes such as safety and 
rehabilitation rates. 
Although governments have not adopted the Model Contract 
and Model Statute for private prisons,183 professional organizations 
should attempt to create a similar model contract or model provisions 
 
 178. See Ratliff, supra note 127, at 419 (“In sum, the vast majority of the nation’s prison 
privatization statutes do not sufficiently insulate inmates’ liberties from contractors’ financial 
biases.”). 
 179. See id. at 423–24 (“[T]o satisfy due process, the state and federal governments cannot 
entrust their rulemaking and adjudicative powers to financially-interested parties. . . . Whether 
or not prison privatization is living up to its policy promises, this Article has shown that the vast 
majority of today's private prison statutes are unconstitutional.”). 
 180. See id. at 407 (“Much like the federal government, twelve states have also taken a 
strikingly lax approach to prison privatization. At the extreme, nine of these states have not 
made even token attempts to limit the breadth of contractors’ powers over inmates’ liberties.”). 
 181. See Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 99, at 1877 (“Contracts 
are necessarily incomplete: because the government and the private provider can only describe 
a general service and cannot specify beforehand in full detail exactly how the contractor should 
provide that service, the contractor has wide latitude in running the prison.”). 
 182. See id. (“[T]he contractor has wide latitude in running the prison.”); Ratliff, supra note 
127, at 403 (“First, I highlight the complete failure of the federal government and twelve of the 
privatizing states to place any meaningful due process restrictions on contractors’ authority.”). 
 183. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
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for SIBs and governments to adopt.184 Like the Model Contract and 
Model Statute for private prisons, an SIB agreement should 
incorporate accountability and government oversight measures.185 
Unlike the Model Contract and Model Statute, in which the primary 
focus is on accountability through numerous specific contractual 
provisions that expose the private-prison operator to contractual 
liability,186 the focus outlined here is on accountability via target 
outcomes that create economic incentives to perform well. The 
emphasis on targeted outcomes is preferable because ensuring 
accountability via specific contractual provisions on every imaginable 
quality control or monitoring issue is unrealistic. In this context, 
several key provisions are suggested below. 
1. Compensation Must Be Tied to Targeted Outcomes and 
Socially Valuable Results.  SIBs are a more optimal form of 
privatization because they link profit to the private actor’s ability to 
achieve targeted outcomes and socially valuable results. Because 
profit is preconditioned on achieving the agreed-upon outcomes, the 
private actor must invest in high-quality programs to achieve such 
results.187 Thus, one of the ways that the contracting government 
agency can ensure high-quality services is to implement robust 
compensation measures. As an example, for the Peterborough SIB, 
government officials determined the value of rehabilitation (the 
targeted outcome) by using a “value for each reduced reconviction 
event” and “the number of reduced reconviction events.”188 Because 
the value for each reduced reconviction event will likely be the 
product of negotiation between the government and the intermediary 
or management organization,189 this is one way in which the 
government can ensure that the private sector does not improperly 
 
 184. See DISLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at 54 (“[S]ome interviewees reported an appetite for, 
and interest in, developing some standard contract terms and definitions for SIBs, which could 
make drafting and signing up to future SIB contracts an easier process.”). 
 185. See supra notes 170–74 and accompanying text. 
 186. See Robbins, supra note 133, at 616 (“The contractor’s failure to meet its contractual 
obligations could make it liable to the contracting agency for breach of contract and, under the 
language of the Model Contract, to the public and inmates as third-party beneficiaries.”). 
 187. See LIEBMAN, supra note 42, at 2 (describing the link between the private investor 
engaging in quality control and choosing the service provider who is “likely to achieve” the 
agreed-upon outcomes). 
 188. DISLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at 40. 
 189. See id. (noting that the “value for each reduced reconviction event” was “negotiated 
and agreed between Social Finance and the Ministry of Justice”). 
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influence policymaking by setting its own optimal target for lowering 
recidivism rates. 
Yet, it is important to note that this goal is a product of 
negotiation, and, thus, SIB actors will be able to influence the 
targeted outcomes based upon the amount of risk they think they can 
bear. Nonetheless, because the desired outcome will save a 
government more money than what it will expend if the outcome is 
met, a government pays only for socially valuable results.190 And 
because a private actor will want to maximize its chances of meeting 
the targeted outcomes, SIBs incentivize a private actor to invest in 
high-quality programs and to identify and curb any abuses against the 
target population.191 Therefore, provisions tying profit to results as 
opposed to inputs are the most integral component of the agreement, 
and SIB actors must identify precisely the targeted outputs to be 
achieved by the program, operation, or services. 
Hence, it cannot be underscored enough how the SIB model 
improves upon traditional forms of privatization such as private 
prisons in which the private contractor receives up-front government 
payment to fund inputs. The pressure to meet the outcomes to make 
a profit shifts much of the burden to ensure the success of the 
program to the private actors involved in the SIB.192 
The remaining proposals below suggest how the government can 
mitigate the quality-concern issues and monitoring issues associated 
with private prisons by requiring certain provisions in the SIB 
contract. Unlike in the private-prison context, in which the operator 
would likely not follow the provisions without being required to do 
so, in the SIB context, the private actor will likely adopt these 
provisions even without contractual pressure to ensure that the 
program is successful. For example, to achieve a reduction in 
recidivism rates among high-risk repeat offenders, an organization 
has to invest in a highly qualified service provider whose employees 
meet certain minimal qualifications and training requirements,193 even 
 
 190. See BLOOMBERG, supra note 59, at 7 (showing that if there is a reduction in 
reincarceration rates of 16 percent or more, the city’s projected long-term net savings are 
greater than the city’s payment to the intermediary organization). 
 191. See LIEBMAN, supra note 42, at 2 (explaining that “private investors also perform an 
important form of quality control” because they must pick high-quality service providers who 
can achieve the outcomes and that they are incentivized to monitor the program). 
 192. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 3, at 7 (explaining that it is “philanthropic funders 
and impact investors” who assume the “financial risk of expanding” socially valuable programs). 
 193. See supra Part IV.B. 
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if the SIB agreement does not specify what qualifications or what 
level of training is required. The same reasoning applies when 
considering the program’s minimal staff-ratio and monitoring 
requirements. Nonetheless, provisions in the agreement add an extra 
layer of security by ensuring the private actor’s adherence to the 
provisions. But agreements are often incomplete. When the 
agreement is silent on an important quality-control issue, the 
economic incentives that SIBs create are powerful because they 
increase the chances that the private actor will err on the side of 
higher quality to maximize profit even without specific contractual 
provisions requiring it to do so. 
2. Establishing Employee Qualifications and the Service Provider.  
An additional way to ensure high-quality rehabilitative services is for 
the government to set minimal qualifications for employees who are 
providing the rehabilitative services. Like the Model Contract and 
Model Statute provisions regarding employee training, there should 
be an established minimal level of training required of all employees 
who engage in rehabilitative services.194 In the context of an SIB to 
lower recidivism rates, this could include a minimal level of work 
experience or required training programs provided by the service 
provider.195 As with private prisons, “[t]raining is one area in which 
prospective contractors may attempt to reduce costs in order to 
ensure that they make a profit.”196 The structure of SIBs mitigates this 
issue because investors will only profit if the services are successful, 
and thus, they will want highly trained staff. Nonetheless, such 
qualifications should be agreed upon in the contract to further ensure 
such high-quality staff and to prevent cost-cutting measures in 
employee training throughout the course of the program. 
3. Monitoring Provisions.  One of the key provisions to ensure 
governmental accountability is to provide for government monitoring 
and oversight in the contract. The SIB contract should include a 
 
 194. See Robbins, supra note 133, at 687 (“It is imperative that all of the private contractor’s 
employees receive adequate training in order to ensure the safety and security of the inmates, 
the staff, and the surrounding community.”). 
 195. See id. (“The Model Contract requires that all prison and jail employees receive new-
employee orientation training prior to their initial assignment with the contractor. It also 
provides for regular training and continuing-education programs that are appropriate for the 
various types of employment.”). 
 196. Id. at 781. 
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provision that the monitor will be an employee of the contracting 
government agency and will have unimpeded access to the 
rehabilitative-services site.197 Furthermore, the contract should 
provide that the monitor will have complete access to records and 
other documentation related to the administration of the 
rehabilitation services.198 
In sum, these provisions have the potential to solve many of the 
issues affecting private prisons. Unlike with private prisons, these 
model provisions might have a considerable impact on the emergence 
of SIBs because there are not many SIB agreements already in 
existence.199 Because contracts can mitigate many of the negative 
aspects of private prisons, governments should be advised of the 
critical role contractual terms play in developing effective SIBs. 
Though the contract can include specific provisions regarding quality-
control issues and government oversight of the services to be 
administered, the primary focus should be to establish well-defined 
and measurable outcomes. It is these targeted outcomes and the 
incentives they create that result in high-quality programs, sufficient 
internal monitoring, and general accountability of the private sector 
in SIBs. 
V.  LESSONS LEARNED FROM SIBS AND THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
OF SIBS 
The potential problems facing SIBs and the proposed potential 
solutions are informed by and build upon private-prison research. An 
unexplored aspect of SIBs is how their elements can remedy existing 
problematic privatization schemes such as private prisons. Up to this 
point, this Note has focused on the problems facing private prisons,200 
how they will affect SIBs,201 and how SIBs can overcome such 
problems both structurally and through modifications in the SIB 
agreement.202 Even though private-prison research demonstrates ways 
 
 197. See id. at 752 (“The contract monitor [and his or her staff] shall be provided an office in 
the facility and shall have access at all times, with or without notice, to inmates and staff, [and] 
to all areas of the facility . . . .” (first alteration in original)). 
 198. See id. (“The contract monitor . . . shall have access at all times . . . to all books, records 
(including financial records), and reports kept by the contractor concerning the renovation, 
repair, construction, maintenance, and operation of the facility.”). 
 199. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra Part III. 
 201. See supra Part IV. 
 202. See supra Part IV. 
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to maximize the success of SIBs, the reverse point can be made as 
well. That is, SIBs themselves offer instructive lessons that can help 
remedy problems embedded in existing privatization models. 
Additionally, if SIBs are to be used more widely or if their elements 
are to be incorporated into existing privatization schemes, 
governments must understand how SIBs fit within and alter the 
current debate over the privatization of public services for profit. 
A. SIBs Offer Lessons to Make Private Prisons More Safe, Just, and 
Effective 
The economic-incentive structure of SIBs provides an instructive 
lesson in how to improve the overall quality, justness, and 
effectiveness of private prisons. An overarching theme of this Note is 
that when economic incentives are embedded contractually such that 
private profit is tied to outcomes, it increases the chances of attaining 
socially valuable results and minimizes the risk that the quality of a 
program might be compromised in the name of efficiency. The 
current payment structure for private prisons, however, creates a 
completely different and perverse incentive.203 Because private 
prisons are funded on a per-prisoner basis, they incentivize private-
prison operators to refrain from funding rehabilitation programs so as 
to generate a steady stream of prisoners to maximize profit.204 This 
incentive is so contrary to the public interest and safety that the 
payment structure of private prisons should be changed to reflect the 
payment structure of SIBs to ensure more safe, just, and effective 
private prisons. 
Private-prison contracts must create “more efficient 
incentives.”205 One solution is to model the payment like an SIB in 
 
 203. See Peter J. Duitsman, Comment, The Private Prison Experiment: A Private Sector 
Solution to Prison Overcrowding, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2209, 2262 (1998) (“[M]any opponents of 
private prisons are concerned that the profit motive and the per diem payment plan provided in 
many contracts create an incentive for private prisons to desire recidivism.”). 
 204. Cf. Daniel L. Low, Nonprofit Private Prisons: The Next Generation of Prison 
Management, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 7 (2003) (“For-profit 
organizations have a fiduciary duty to shareholders to maximize profits, so they cannot spend 
money on improving prison conditions or improving rehabilitation programs unless it will 
increase their profits.”). 
 205. See id. at 46 (“Some of these problems could be rectified if contracts with private 
prisons created more efficient incentives. . . . Such an incentive system would internalize the 
externalities of investments in programs and the social costs of recidivism, improve long-term 
efficiency, and encourage private prisons to improve rehabilitation programs and prison 
conditions.”); see also Duitsman, supra note 203, at 2262 (“[C]ommentators have proposed that 
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which the payment depends entirely upon achieving the targeted 
outcomes. In the prison context, the targeted outcomes could be the 
rate of violence as compared to counterpart prisons or the rate of 
recidivism of prisoners released from the private prison as compared 
to counterpart prisons. Thus far, there have not been strong calls for a 
contractual provision that makes payment entirely contingent upon 
achieving such results. Rather, critics of the current private-prison 
system have called for a nonprofit private system with the same per 
diem payment model as private prisons or have argued that the 
government can offer “a bonus for recidivism performance in 
addition to the per diem payment.”206 Even critics of private prisons 
have adhered to the per diem payment plan because many private-
prison firms do not have enough capital to run large-scale prisons 
without the government’s up-front financing.207 
Payment schemes can be reformed such that the government 
pays the private-prison operator an up-front per diem rate that allows 
the operator to break even and that allows the government to 
precondition any profit upon a particular violent-incident rate or 
recidivism rate. This scheme would still persuade private-prison 
operators to enter into prison-operating contracts because of the 
potential for profit. At the same time, it would also incentivize them 
to sustain prisons with sufficient numbers of highly trained guards to 
lower violent incidents and to invest in rehabilitation programs that 
lower recidivism rates. Because the potential for profit is located in 
lowering rates of violence and recidivism, this model removes the 
perverse incentive to have as many prisoners incarcerated as possible. 
Furthermore, this payment scheme would mitigate each of the 
three problems plaguing private prisons. Because payment would no 
longer be on a per-prisoner basis, it would remove the incentive to 
 
contracts may actually be used to require reduced rates of recidivism. Using contract-based fines 
to penalize private prison operators for violations of recidivism-reduction requirements, inmate 
safety, health care quality, or other standards, agreements between private contractors and the 
government can invoke the profit motive to encourage compliance with the state’s defined goals 
of incarceration.” (footnote omitted)). Both of these sources explain an interest among actors to 
embed contractual economic incentives, but nothing as strong or as potent as those incentives 
structurally embedded in an SIB, in which payment depends completely on the achievement of 
agreed-upon outcomes. 
 206. Low, supra note 204, at 46. 
 207. See id. at 7 (“Government contracts provide the almost exclusive source of revenue for 
private prisons . . . .”). 
BALIGA IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  3:10 AM 
2013] SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 475 
adversely affect and prolong a prisoner’s sentence.208 Additionally, 
because profit depends upon lowering violence and recidivism rates, 
prison operators would be incentivized to invest in a greater number 
of well-trained prison guards and rehabilitation programs, thus 
mitigating the quality issues associated with private prisons.209 And 
finally, preconditioned payments would incentivize private firms to 
self-monitor abuses in their prisons because the more frequently 
abuses are committed against prisoners, the lower the chances that 
the private-prison operators can meet the outcomes required to make 
a profit.210 Therefore, aspects of the SIB economic-incentive model 
can be incorporated into private-prison contracts to ensure socially 
valuable results such as an increase in the quality and safety of prisons 
as well as a decrease in recidivism among those housed in private 
prisons. 
B. SIBs in the Context of the Larger Privatization Debate and 
Counterarguments 
The economic incentives underlying SIBs constitute a critical 
advantage over traditional privatization models. Although this Note 
advocates that elements of SIBs can remedy the privatization ills of 
private prisons, SIBs raise a unique set of concerns related to the 
larger privatization debate. As officials adopt SIBs or some of their 
elements to improve private prisons, they must be cognizant of the 
ways in which SIBs contribute to the existing privatization debate and 
the counterarguments against their implementation. 
SIBs simultaneously form a part of the existing privatization 
debate while altering it as well. Thus far the policy colloquy 
surrounding privatization has focused on whether the private or 
public sector can carry out services more efficiently.211 This 
comparative debate pits public against private and usually concludes 
 
 208. See Duitsman, supra note 203, at 2263 (surmising that a per diem payment scheme may 
influence private-prison operators facing financial pressure to “disallow ‘good time’” but that 
contracting can mitigate these concerns). 
 209. See id. at 2261–62 (describing how performance-based measures and the profit motive 
in a private-prison contract can incentivize private-prison firms to invest in rehabilitative 
programs for prisoners). 
 210. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 211. Dolovich, supra note 12, at 441 (“[D]ebate on this issue has focused on the relative 
efficiency of private prisons as compared to their publicly run counterparts and has assumed 
that, if private contractors can run the prisons for less money than the state without a drop in 
quality, then states should be willing to privatize.”). 
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that one is the victor.212 SIBs, however, are fundamentally 
transforming this one-dimensional normative debate into one that 
examines a shared partnership between the government and the 
private sector.213 SIBs necessitate shared decisionmaking authority 
that culminates in a partnership between the government and the 
private sector.214 SIBs cannot be easily characterized as a situation in 
which the government abdicates its role and the private sector 
assumes that role purely to profit. Rather, SIBs acknowledge that to 
address the many serious issues facing this country, there is a role for 
both the public and private sectors to execute.215 
In this light, SIBs bring together the government, private 
investors, NGOs, and nonprofits to assume the role for which each is 
best suited to maximize efficiency and quality. Though the 
government transfers a considerable amount of power to other 
players, it by no means abdicates its role, but rather leads when it 
comes to setting targeted outcomes that fuel economic incentives.216 
This dispersion of power is a key aspect of SIBs, and the normative 
debate should focus on the challenges surrounding the distribution of 
power and the ability of multiple players to work together to 
accomplish shared goals.217 
Opponents of SIBs may raise the increased costs of negotiation 
among multiple actors as a counterargument against their 
implementation. In response, it should be noted that the increased 
 
 212. See id. (“The private prisons issue has thus widely been viewed as a choice—even a 
competition—between alternative organizational forms.”). 
 213. See SOC. FIN., supra note 20, at 22 (“SIBs signify a new paradigm of public-private 
partnerships in the wake of the financial crisis, one that privatizes the risks and shares the 
gains.”). 
 214. See id. at 16 (“Although complex, the SIB partnership establishes a system of checks 
and balances that prevents any single party’s self-interest from undermining the pursuit of 
shared objectives.”). 
 215. See Katie Gilbert, The Latest in Socially Conscious Investing: Human Capital 
Performance Bonds, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Jan. 10, 2012), http://payforsuccess.org/
sites/default/files/institutional_investor__the_latest_in_socially_conscious_investing__human_ca
pital_performance_bonds.pdf (“Whether or not pay-for-success is the model that sticks, the 
White House’s Marta Urquilla says that going forward, the public sector will be increasingly 
interested in opportunities to partner with private capital to address social issues that have 
grown too large for the government to handle alone.”). 
 216. See Costa & Kohli, supra note 19 (“Massachusetts, and any future government entity 
entering into a social impact bond agreement, will need to ensure that outcomes are specific, 
measurable, and stringent enough that they cannot be accomplished merely by chance.”). 
 217. See generally DISLEY ET AL., supra note 45 (presenting interviews and 
recommendations in an evaluation that concern the actors’ abilities to work together in 
contracting, implementing, and executing the SIB). 
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up-front costs of SIBs have not deterred Goldman Sachs from 
funding an SIB. Nonetheless, at this point in time, too few SIBs exist 
to empirically compare the costs and benefits of SIBs to the costs and 
benefits of traditional privatization programs. Although such an 
analysis will likely be useful, especially in ascertaining the deterrent 
effect that any such costs may have on the implementation of SIBs, 
such empirical questions are beyond the scope of this Note and are an 
area for further scholarship comparing the desirability of SIBs to 
traditional forms of privatization. 
A second potential aspect of the SIB debate focuses not on the 
distinction between the private and public sector, but rather on the 
meta-theoretical aspects of this nontraditional form of governance. 
SIBs are unique because in one sense, they facilitate executive 
aggrandizement and in another sense, they necessitate shared 
decisionmaking as described above.218 The executive-aggrandizing 
aspect of SIBs, as compared to other traditional forms of 
privatization, is a potential counterargument against their 
implementation. SIBs facilitate executive aggrandizement because 
they allow the executive greater power via government contracts to 
accomplish “distinct public policy goals that — but for the pretext of 
technocratic outsourcing — would be impossible or much more 
difficult to attain in the ordinary course of nonprivatized public 
administration.”219 For example, to establish the Rikers prisoner-
rehabilitation SIB, there was no bill introduced in the legislature, no 
legislative debate, and no legislative approval for the use of this 
SIB.220 Rather, it was Mayor Bloomberg’s office that coordinated with 
Goldman Sachs (the private investor) and MDRC (the intermediary) 
to negotiate an agreement largely “behind closed doors.”221 Because 
the crux of an SIB is the agreement itself, it usually takes a small 
group of government officials (usually the executive’s staff members) 
to negotiate the contract on behalf of the government.222 Though 
legislatures may play a role in allocating funds for SIBs generally,223 it 
 
 218. See supra notes 214–17 and accompanying text. 
 219. See Michaels, supra note 85, at 719 (arguing that privatization results in “workarounds” 
that increase the executive’s power). 
 220. See Costa & Kohli, supra note 19 (detailing the emergence of the SIB at Rikers). 
 221. Id. 
 222. See Costa & Kohli, supra note 19 (explaining that it was Mayor Bloomberg’s 
administration in New York City and Governor Patrick’s administration in Massachusetts that 
took the lead in establishing the SIBs). 
 223. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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is the executive branch that will likely decide which SIBs are worth 
investing in and how to structure the agreement.224 Executive 
aggrandizement is not necessarily a negative aspect of SIBs, however, 
especially when the very structure of SIBs requires a few key 
stakeholders to negotiate the agreement on behalf of the 
government.225 Nonetheless, executive aggrandizement is a unique 
aspect of SIBs that merits attention as SIBs emerge as a prominent 
solution to complex policy problems. 
In sum, just as the lessons learned from the pitfalls of private 
prisons offer instructive insight into creating successful SIBs, the 
economic-incentive structure of SIBs also suggests solutions to the 
problems plaguing private prisons. The interest in incorporating 
elements of SIBs into private-prison agreements and adopting them 
wholly means that government officials will have to be alert to new 
issues surrounding this form of privatization. 
CONCLUSION 
Although SIBs are still in their infancy, there is considerable 
interest in their use among local, state, and federal government 
officials. Yet with no tangible data on the success of SIBs, 
government officials and private investors seeking to collaborate in 
an SIB have limited information as to the challenges they will face. 
Though there is no substitute for concrete results, this Note strives to 
give potential SIB actors greater predictability regarding the 
challenges they will face by using the privatization of prisons as an 
analog to the use of SIBs. This analysis creates a dual paradigm in 
which the problems facing private prisons offer instructive lessons to 
maximize the success of SIBs, and conversely, the economic-incentive 
structure of SIBs offers ways to improve private prisons. 
Beyond offering lessons to improve private prisons, SIBs can 
influence the privatization debate more generally. SIBs alter existing 
privatization models by tying private profit to socially valuable 
results. In this light, the structure of SIBs creates economic incentives 
that can mitigate the accountability, quality, and monitoring problems 
associated with privatization. Additionally, unlike other forms of 
privatization, SIBs differ considerably because they require a shared 
 
 224. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 225. See DISLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at 54 (describing the complexity of SIB contracts). 
Because SIB contracts are complex and involve experience with “private finance initiative 
contracts,” see id., the pool of people negotiating these contracts will be small. 
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partnership between private and public actors. This characteristic 
changes the very landscape of the privatization debate by shifting the 
debate from which actor can better deliver a given service to how 
each actor can work together to collectively deliver the service. 
Governments should be cautiously optimistic about this 
innovative new financing scheme. Although real results are needed 
before hailing SIBs as a revolutionary funding model, their 
theoretical ability to mitigate many privatization ills is promising. 
Therefore, with appropriate contractual planning and coordination 
among private and public actors, SIBs have the potential to remedy a 
variety of pressing social ills such as by lowering recidivism rates, 
improving access to early childhood education, and lowering 
homelessness rates. Though these programs do not have the political 
salability to yield up-front public funding, SIBs offer new hope for 
sustained investment in these important social programs. 
